I. Introduction
As I contemplate the scholarly career and impressive body of work of Dennis Showalter, I fi nd myself thinking about the nature of history itself, of the relationship between personality and the impersonal phenomena that are said to determine how things unfold. No military historian has been as adept as Showalter at analyzing both sides of this equation. He knows his battles and leaders as well as anyone, and can "throw down, " as our students say, on the details of battle, campaign, and strategy. At the same time, he is the best military sociologist around. No one can better trace the relationship of armies to the societies that spawn them and the matrix of factors that turns some forces into sharks and others into their bait.
In this, as in so many other things, Showalter has been anything but typical. Military history, by and large, is still wedded to the role of personality. Armies, doctrines, "ways of war, " competing socio-economic systems and political ideologies: we all recognize that they have a role to play, of course, and oft en a very important one. As a collective, however, we continue to look to the individual-usually, of course "the man"-who at some crucial moment managed to bend an unruly battlefi eld situation to his will. It might involve a commander shift ing a reserve division to a crucial spot on the battlefi eld; or identifying a critical enemy weakness that he is then able to exploit; or devising a bold stratagem that transforms a hopeless situation; or being aggressive enough to take advantage of fl eeting opportunities when they off er themselves. Indeed, add those four items together-clever planning, skillful maneuver, the ability to take things in at a glance and see what must be done (Napoleon's famous coup d' oeil), and an innate sense of aggression, and you have a decent taxonomy of the term "genius, " or at least what military historians usually mean when they employ the term. No matter how sophisticated the analysis, therefore, we still tend to look to the man. We can take into account the diff erences in military systems between the Prussians and the Franco-Imperial Army in 1757, for example, parsing matters of soldierly motivation, variances in training, and the diff erent societies out of which they sprung, as Showalter did so expertly in Th e Wars of Frederick the Great, but we still tend to say that Frederick the Great "won" the battle of Rossbach. And indeed, there is some truth to the claim. Th e steady calm when he realized the French were trying to slip around his left fl ank, the rapidity with which he had his army break camp and head to the east, the ease with which his well drilled cavalry outpaced their adversary, and then fi nally the culminating maneuver down onto the point of the Franco-Imperial column, literally "crossing their T" and riding over them before they were fully deployed: well, let's just say there was a reason his contemporaries decided to dub Frederick "the Great. "
We can quibble with this particular Rossbach-Bild, of course. It was General Friedrich von Seydlitz who commanded the Prussian cavalry, not Frederick, and the brio of both the top-speed ride and the great charge itself may belong as much to the general as it did to the King. Th e Franco-Imperial army, with a dual-hatted leadership and a polyglot rank and fi le, was a command and control implosion waiting to happen. Th e French were tied to a logistics train a hundred miles long, burdened not just with the traditional military impedimenta, but with wigs and perfumes and cognac and silk stockings and every manner of creature comforts, and as a result any maneuver they tried to make was probably going to be too slow.
1 All these things are true. And yet, Rossbach seems destined forevermore to be one of the battles trotted out when historians want to discuss Frederick's greatness.
It is much the same with other alleged examples of battlefi eld genius: Robert E. Lee at Chancellorsville; Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder) at Königgrätz; Napoleon at Arcola or Ulm or Austerlitz or Friedland or any number of his other battles. Certainly we can say that there were systemic factors at work in all these decisive victories. Lee had a gift ed subordinate commander, General Th omas "Stonewall" Jackson, whose
